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1 Introduction
It has been well documented that mergers occur in waves, clustering in time and
by industry (e.g. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001; Mitchell and Mulherin
1996). Some merger waves are horizontal, consisting mainly of mergers between
competing firms in the same industry, while some others are vertical, made up
mainly of mergers between suppliers and customers. For example, the first great
merger wave in the United States (1890s–1904) was horizontal. Consolidation
between competitors generated corporate giants in the steel, telephone, oil,
mining, railroad, and other major manufacturing and service industries. The
second great merger wave (1910s–1929), by contrast, was mainly vertical. Ford
and General Motors emerged as the major automobile manufacturers through
vertical integration, acquiring every business along the supply chain from iron
and coal mining to railroads and water transportation, steel mills, all the way to
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finished vehicles (Lipton 2006; Martynova and Renneboog 2008). In the United
States, the cement and ready-mixed concrete industries underwent at least two
waves of vertical integration in the 1960s and 1980s (Hortacsu and Syverson 2007).
Horizontal mergers may cluster not only in a single industry, but also across
several industries that are vertically related. For example, a series of mergers in
the US pharmaceutical industry occurred in 2007 to counteract the increased
bargaining power in the downstream health care industry, where consolidation
had been taking place.1 Furthermore, a wave of integration along one dimension
may follow a wave of disintegration along another. In other words, the market
may switch between vertical and horizontal integrations. Semiconductor com-
panies used to be vertically integrated. With rising costs and a changing cost
structure, economies of scale became more important, and firms started to
disintegrate vertically and merge horizontally.2
These examples highlight the need to study horizontal and vertical mergers
together, as a merger will alter the incentives for other mergers, and the impacts
are likely to be different depending on whether the mergers are vertical or
horizontal. Given the observed regularity of horizontal and vertical merger
waves, the following questions immediately emerge: What causes firms to
merge in vertically related industries? Why do they merge in waves? And what
determines whether a wave is vertical or horizontal? There have been some
economic studies on horizontal merger waves (in a single industry) and a few on
vertical merger waves, but virtually none in which the two are considered
together. This research studied mergers in vertically related industries and is
therefore well positioned to address the last question. In doing so, the analysis
has shed new light on the answers to the first two questions.
Consider two vertically related industries, each consisting of two firms that
may engage in both horizontal and vertical mergers.3 Mergers must be endogen-
ous, i.e. the market structure shifts from a stable configuration in which no firm
is merged to another in which many firms are merged. The analysis shows that a
market structure is stable only when no firm merges or all firms merge, so
mergers always occur in waves. Depending on whether the stability conditions
for the two structures coincide, a merger wave may be triggered in two ways.
Market structure may change because the underlying conditions have changed,
or firms switch between stable structures without any change in the
1 “Meandering giants,” The Economist, March 24, 2007.
2 “Under new management,” The Economist, April 2, 2009.
3 Since each industry has only two firms, a horizontal merger “wave” in this context would be
horizontal mergers in both industries, which is slightly different from the usual meaning of
multiple mergers in a single industry.
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fundamentals. The first case corresponds, for example, to an economic shock
that changes the cost, demand, or regulatory situation, so the trigger is tangible.
In the second case, the trigger may be intangible, corresponding to something
trivial or totally unrelated to the underlying economic conditions, such as
rumors or changes in mood or expectations.
The main contribution of this study is to link the two triggers to demand and
cost properties, and to identify the conditions determining whether a merger
wave is horizontal or vertical. We find that the stability of market structure
depends crucially on the relative intensity between vertical and horizontal
externalities, and the relative intensity of upstream and downstream competi-
tion. Vertical mergers eliminate vertical externalities (double markup) but inten-
sify horizontal externalities (competition in the downstream industry).
Horizontal mergers lessen horizontal externalities in both industries but exacer-
bate vertical externalities. If the two externalities are balanced, one will mitigate
the other as long as all four firms remain independent. This explains why firms
may refrain from merging, a necessary component for the endogenization of
merger waves. If the balance is disrupted, i.e. if the externalities become more
severe along either dimension, firms will start to merge. For example, when the
demand for the final product becomes more convex, double markup will be
more damaging, which strengthens the incentive for vertical integration.
While the externalities mainly affect the four firms’ total profits, the relative
intensity of competition in the two industries affects how the total profits are
distributed among them. When competition in the two industries is balanced,
firms tend to remain independent or merge vertically. When the balance is
disrupted, firms will merge horizontally. For example, when the final products
become closer substitutes, horizontal competition is intensified and firms merge
horizontally in both industries. So competition in one industry may induce
mergers in a vertically related industry. Not merging and vertical mergers tend
to share the same conditions while horizontal mergers correspond to different
conditions, so vertical merger waves are more likely to be associated with
intangible triggers, while a horizontal merger wave tends to be associated with
a tangible trigger.
Research has long established that mergers tend to occur in waves, and
scholars have usually explained the waves in terms of economic shocks at the
industry or economy level (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001; Andrade and
Stafford 2004; Harford 2005; Jensen 1993; Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002;
Mitchell and Mulherin 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 2003). In the industrial orga-
nization literature, there are a few theoretical papers on merger waves, all in a
single industry. Nilssen and Sorgard (1998) have analyzed sequential horizontal
mergers to demonstrate their temporal interdependence. Fauli-Oller (2000) has
Vertical or Horizontal Merger Waves 1239
Brought to you by | University of Hong Kong Libraries
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/29/15 10:18 AM
studied sequential mergers among firms with asymmetric costs, and found that a
merger’s profitability is affected by both the demand level and mergers among
other firms.4 Qiu and Zhou (2007) endogenize multiple mergers and attribute
merger waves to economic shocks. While these papers focus on the interaction
between mergers in a single industry, we are interested in the ultimate causes
for mergers in vertically related industries, where the choice between vertical
and horizontal mergers becomes a central issue.
Toxvaerd (2008) has shown in a timing game that no-merger and multiple
merger may coexist, which implies the possibility of tangible and intangible
triggers. Nevertheless, the driving force for the two triggers in our model is very
different and, more importantly, we relate the triggers to types of merger waves
and specific demand and cost conditions. Colangelo (1995) has studied vertical
and horizontal mergers together. He is mainly interested in exclusive, single
mergers that are assumed to be substitutes, while this study considers multiple
mergers that turn out to be complements. Colangelo’s merger decisions are
sequential and semi-exogenous, while in this study everything including the
merger process is endogenous. Giovannetti (2005) has analyzed a “diagonal”
merger, which contains both vertical and horizontal elements, between two
Internet Service Providers, and demonstrated the possibility of foreclosure in
the market where the merger is horizontal but not in the market where it is
vertical. Both our paper and Giovannetti’s (2005) study mergers involving ver-
tical and horizontal relations, and both consider product differentiation. While
Giovannetti has studied a single exogenous merger in the context of internet
service providers with the bottleneck features, we are primarily interested in
multiple, endogenous mergers in a more traditional setting with upstream
wholesalers and downstream retailers. He has focused on the effect of the
merger on foreclosure, while we focus on the stability of market structure.
Greenhut and Ohta (1979) have demonstrated that successive duopolists
would both merge vertically, but Bonanno and Vickers (1988) and Lin (1988)
have shown that firms may choose vertical disintegration in order to dampen
downstream competition. Our model synthesizes these contradictory results, as
we show that both market structures can be stable even under the same condi-
tions. Like Greenhut and Ohta (1979), we emphasize the role of double markup
in driving vertical mergers. Like Bonanno and Vickers (1988) and Lin (1988), we
show that firms may refrain from profitable vertical mergers because vertical
disintegration generates a vertical externality that mitigates the horizontal
externality associated with horizontal competition. Unlike their setting in
4 Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) have shown that firms may merge to prevent their partners
from merging with a rival.
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which the only alternative to not merging is vertical integration, firms in our
model have the additional option of horizontal merger.
2 Model
Consider two vertically related industries. The upstream industry consists of two
identical firms, A and B, and the downstream industry also consists of two
identical firms, 1 and 2. A homogeneous input is produced by each upstream
firm at cost CðqÞ, where q is the produced quantity. The input is sold through
arm’s-length transaction to the downstream firms, which then transform it into a
final product at zero extra cost on a one-for-one basis. The demand for final
product i is piðqi; qjÞ, where i; j 2 f1; 2g and ij, with @pi@qi 
@pi
@qj
 0.
The firms play a two-stage game. In stage 1, each firm chooses simultaneously
a merger partner. A firm can commit to independence by choosing itself as the
partner. A merger can be either horizontal (between two downstream firms or two
upstream firms) or vertical (between a downstream firm and an upstream firm),
and it takes place if and only if two firms choose each other as partners. A merged
entity is not allowed to participate in any further mergers.5 The merger decisions
result in a market configuration, which is publicly announced.
The game then proceeds to stage 2. Given the market configuration from the
first stage, all the resulting firms compete to maximize their payoffs. Within a
merged entity, the two partners share the merger surplus equally,6 where the
surplus is calculated assuming a fixed configuration among the other firms. For
example, a merger between firms A and 1 in N;fA;B; 1; 2g leads to S;fB;A1; 2g,
so πSA ¼ πNA þ 12 πSA1  πNA  πN1
 
and πS1 ¼ πN1 þ 12 πSA1  πNA  πN1
 
, where A1
denotes the entity resulting from a merger between firms A and 1, and πXi is
firm i’s payoff in configuration X with i 2 X.
A configuration is stable if no deviation by any individual firm or pair of
firms is profitable. A deviation is profitable if all deviators are better off (strictly
for at least one) for any possible configuration among the other firms. Sasaki
5 If firms are allowed to merge multiple times, the final market structure will inevitably be a
single monopoly encompassing both industries. The assumption precludes such a trivial and
uninteresting case. Besides, merging into monopoly will be prohibited in real life by antitrust
authorities.
6 This assumption can be justified by implementing alternating-offer bargaining à la
Rubinstein (1982). As will be clear later, what matters for the paper’s major conclusion is the
participation constraint rather than the sharing rule: A merger usually takes place if and only if
the two merging firms’ total profits increase; it does not matter how they divide the surplus.
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and Toda (1996) have proved the existence of the equilibrium in the context of
one-to-one matching with externalities.7 We look for conditions for endogenous
merger waves, which are defined as the transition from one stable market
structure in which no firm is merged to another in which all firms are merged.
3 An example
Because the analyses of stable market structure and the corresponding merger
waves are quite involving, it is helpful to first study a more specific setting as an
example. Consider the following demand and costs: The marginal cost of produ-
cing the input is constant: CðqÞ ¼ cq. The final products are perfect substitutes
and the demand for them is linear: p ¼ α Q, where Q is the total quantity
produced by the two downstream firms. Firms compete à la Cournot in both
industries. Each downstream firm regards the input price, denoted t, as given
and chooses its output. The downstream Cournot equilibrium will give rise to Q
as a function of t, which is then inverted to generate the inverse demand for the
input, i.e. t as a function of Q. Facing this derived demand, the upstream firms
engage in their Cournot competition.8
The game is solved by backward induction. Suppose that at the beginning of
stage 2 the market configuration contains v vertically integrated firms, u inde-
pendent upstream firms, and d independent downstream firms. Because mar-
ginal costs are constant and identical within an industry, a horizontal merger is
equivalent to eliminating one of the merging firms. A vertically integrated firm
participates only in the downstream competition,9 and it differs from an
7 Work on coalition formation with externalities (Bloch 1996; Ray and Vohra 1999) has made
use of various equilibrium concepts from cooperative game theory, but those concepts lead to
either a very large set of equilibria or an empty set, therefore, are not suitable for the questions
studied here. The equilibrium concept adopted here captures the essential interdependence of
firms’ merger incentives without having to specify details such as the order of moves, which so
often will greatly affect the equilibrium outcome. Since a merger involves two firms, collective
deviation must be considered, as deviating into a new merger requires two firms to change their
strategies simultaneously. Because a merged entity’s profits depend on other firms’ merger
structures, this merger game is essentially a one-to-one matching game with externalities (Roth
and Sotomayor 1990; Hafalir 2008).
8 The successive Cournot oligopoly setting has been widely used. See Greenhut and Ohta (1976)
and Salinger (1988), for example.
9 Salinger (1988) has pointed out that a vertically integrated entity will withdraw from the
upstream competition – it neither buys the input from other upstream firms nor sells it to other
downstream firms. Some researchers have raised concerns about commitment power in
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independent downstream firm in that its input is procured at cost c rather than
the market price t. In the downstream competition, therefore, a vertically inte-
grated firm chooses qv to maximize πv;ðα Q cÞqv, which leads to the first-
order condition α qv  Q ¼ c. Since Q ¼ vqv þ dqd (using symmetry), the first-
order condition can be rewritten as:
α ðv þ 1Þqv  dqd ¼ c:
Likewise, the first-order condition for an independent downstream firm is
α qd  Q ¼ t, or
α ðdþ 1Þqd  vqv ¼ t:
These two equations lead to
qv ¼ α ðdþ 1Þcþ dtdþ v þ 1 and qd ¼
α ðv þ 1Þt þ vc
dþ v þ 1 :
The demand for the input for independent upstream firms is therefore
Qi; dqd ¼ d½αþ vc ðv þ 1Þtdþ v þ 1 ;
or
t ¼ αþ vc
v þ 1 
dþ v þ 1
dðv þ 1Þ Qi;
where Qi; dqd; uqu is the total quantities produced by the independent
upstream or downstream firms. Facing this derived demand, an upstream firm
will choose qu to maximize πu; αþvcvþ1  dþvþ1dðvþ1ÞQi  c
h i
qu. The Cournot equilibrium
is then given by
qu ¼ dðα cÞðuþ 1Þðdþ v þ 1Þ :
Consequently,
qd ¼ uðα cÞðuþ 1Þðdþ v þ 1Þ ; qv ¼
½dþ ðuþ 1Þðv þ 1Þðα cÞ
ðuþ 1Þðv þ 1Þðdþ v þ 1Þ ;
and Q ¼ ½ðuþ 1Þðv þ 1Þðdþ vÞ  dðα cÞðuþ 1Þðv þ 1Þðdþ v þ 1Þ :
Salinger’s setting, but the issue is not serious in this analysis because firms compete on quantity
rather than price (Hart and Tirole 1990; Ordover, Saloner, and Salop 1990). Schrader and Martin
(1998) provide further arguments in support of Salinger’s conclusion.
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It is clear that all profits are proportional to ðα cÞ2, so we can normalize
α c; 1 without losing any generality. The profits of the three types of the firm
are then:
πvðv; u; dÞ ¼ ½dþ ðuþ 1Þðv þ 1Þ
2
ðuþ 1Þ2ðv þ 1Þ2ðdþ v þ 1Þ2 ;
πuðv; u; dÞ ¼ dðuþ 1Þ2ðv þ 1Þðdþ v þ 1Þ ; and
πdðv; u; dÞ ¼ u
2
ðuþ 1Þ2ðdþ v þ 1Þ2 :
Now move back to stage 1. There are six possible market configurations as listed
in Table 1. Firms’ payoffs can be calculated using the formulas derived above.
For example, in S1;fA;B; 1; 2g, v ¼ 0, u ¼ 2, d ¼ 2. As specified earlier, each
merged entity divides the merger surplus/deficit equally between the two
partners.
Proposition 1. In the example with constant marginal cost for input production,
linear demand for final products that are perfect substitutes, and Cournot compe-
tition in both industries, only S1 and S3 are stable.
Proof: S1 is stable. There are three possible deviations, but none of them are
profitable: Aþ B is unprofitable when 1 and 2 merge; 1þ 2 is unprofitable when
A and B merge; and Aþ 1 is unprofitable when B and 2 merge.
Table 1: Payoffs in the six configurations.10
Configuration πA πB π1 π2 Total profits
S1;fA;B; 1; 2g   . . 
S2;fAB; 12g . .   
S3;fA1;B2g . . . . 
S4;fB; A1; 2g   .  
S5;fAB; 1; 2g     
S6;fA;B; 12g . . . . 
10 For ease of comparison, the fractions of the payoffs are multiplied by 1;000 and turned into
numerical values.
1244 Z. Yao and W. Zhou
Brought to you by | University of Hong Kong Libraries
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/29/15 10:18 AM
S2 is not stable because Aþ 1 is a profitable deviation: If B and 2 merge,
Aþ 1 will leave A indifferent but 1 strictly better off; if B and 2 remain indepen-
dent, both A and 1 are strictly better off.
S3 is stable. There are three possible deviations (excluding symmetric ones),
but none is profitable: Breaking up B2 is unprofitable when A and 1 remain
merged; Aþ B is unprofitable when 1 and 2 merge; 1þ 2 is unprofitable when A
and B merge.
S4 is not stable because Bþ 2 is a profitable deviation (whether A and 1
separate or remain merged).
S5 is not stable because 1þ 2 is a profitable deviation (whether A and B
separate or remain merged).
S6 is not stable because Aþ B is a profitable deviation (whether 1 and 2
separate or remain merged). Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 says that a stable configuration will have either four independent
firms or two vertically merged firms. To understand this conclusion, it is useful
to summarize the payoffs in Table 1 into the following three rankings.
R1: An exogenous merger, one fixing the configuration among the remaining
two firms, is always profitable. This is because a merger internalizes either the
horizontal externality (due to horizontal competition) or the vertical externality
(due to double markup), which benefits the merging firms.
R2: A merger always hurts other firms and consequently a breakup always
benefits other firms. By eliminating double markup, a vertical merger makes the
merged entity more aggressive in the downstream competition, which hurts the
remaining firms. A horizontal merger between duopolists will hurt the other
industry by reducing quantities supplied or demanded.
R3: S1 Pareto dominates S3, which in turn dominates S2. Firms face horizon-
tal externality in S3 and therefore tend to produce too much from the viewpoint
of their joint profits. They face vertical externality in S2 and tend to produce too
little. Both externalities are present in S1, but their opposite effects mitigate each
other, so S1 dominates both S2 and S3. The horizontal externality in S3 is
moderate because the downstream competition (Cournot rather than Bertrand)
is mild, while the vertical externality in S2 is severe because it leads to succes-
sive monopoly, so S3 dominates S2.
These three profit ranks help us understand the intuition for stable struc-
tures. First, it cannot be stable to have only one merger because the remaining
two independent firms will be better off merging. They gain if the originally
merged firm remains merged (R1) and will gain even more if the merged firm
breaks up (R2). Second, having two horizontal mergers is unstable, as an
upstream firm and a downstream firm would rather merge vertically. Such a
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deviation is profitable if the other two firms also merge vertically (R3) and is
even more profitable if the other two firms do not merge (R2).
That leaves two configurations: all firms remain independent (S1) or carry
out two vertical mergers (S3). Both are stable. Consider first the no-merger case.
An exogenous merger would have been profitable (R1). However, if the other two
firms also merge, the participants in the first merger would be worse off (R3).
Therefore, no deviation (in the form of a merger) will be carried out in S1. Now
consider two vertical mergers. It is unprofitable to either break up (if the other
merged firm remains merged – R1) or switch to a horizontal merger (if the other
two firms also merge horizontally – R3).
The stable market structures depicted in Proposition 1 display some inter-
esting features. We would like to highlight four of them. First, mergers occur in
waves. Proposition 1 reveals that it is stable to have two vertical merged firms
(S3) and unstable to have a single merger (S4, S5, and S6). Therefore, whenever a
merger occurs, it must be accompanied by another. A single merger hurts the
other two firms, which will then find it profitable to merge regardless of what the
first pair does (dissolves or remains merged). So the driving force for mergers to
cluster is the negative impact of a merger on other firms.
Second, it is also stable for all four firms to remain independent (S1) even
though any individual merger would have been profitable. When a given merger
is said to be profitable, the configuration among the remaining two firms is
implicitly assumed to be fixed, i.e. they remain independent. If those two firms
also merge, however, the first pair will be hurt. Concerns about a second
merger’s negative impact therefore prevent the first merger from taking place.
Third, a merger wave may take place without any fundamental change in
the underlying conditions. Proposition 1 predicts two stable configurations: The
firms may remain in S1 (or 4I, meaning four independent firms, for a more
informative notation) or they may carry out two vertical mergers, ending up
with S3 (or 2V). A change of the market structure from 4I to 2V duly endogenizes
the vertical merger wave. Because the two structures are stable under the same
conditions, shifting from 4I to 2V does not require any change in the economic
fundamentals such as demand or technology. The trigger may be something
trivial or totally unrelated: mood, expectation, rumor, etc.11
11 Although 4I and 2V are both stable, they are not on an equal footing. Switching from 4I to 2V
is possible or even likely because if, for whatever reason, a pair of firms expect the other pair to
merge, they will prepare to follow suit. The reverse process of jumping from 2V to 4I, a
divestiture wave, is more difficult. If for some reason a pair breaks up, it is in the best interest
of the second pair not to follow. This asymmetry between the two stable configurations may
explain why in real life merger waves are much more common than divestiture waves.
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Fourth, a merger wave could be vertical or horizontal depending on the tradeoff
between the vertical and horizontal externalities. In a 2  2 setting a merger wave
may consist of two vertical mergers (2V) or two horizontal mergers (S2 or 2H),
referred to, respectively, as vertical and horizontal merger waves. A firm chooses a
vertical or horizontal merger taking into account possible reactions by the remaining
firms, so ultimately it is a choice between 2V and 2H. As mentioned earlier, 2V
eliminates double markup but intensifies horizontal competition; 2H does the
opposite. In this example’s particular setting, the damage of double markup is
greater than that of horizontal competition, so the firms end up making two vertical
mergers. In more general settings, however, the comparison may be reversed and
horizontal mergers may emerge in equilibrium. If, for example, the competition is à
la Bertrand rather than Cournot, a merger wave could be horizontal.
4 Analysis
The example in the previous section analyzes merger waves in a specific setting.
To better understand why and how merger waves take place, it is necessary to
change the demand and cost conditions and the nature of competition in a
systematic way. In what follows, we will allow product differentiation, non-
linear cost or demand, and price/quantity competition. As will be clear shortly,
these settings directly affect the competition intensity along upstream, down-
stream and vertical dimensions, which turns out to be crucial for merger waves.
4.1 Product Differentiation
Suppose that the final products are differentiated (though the inputs are still
homogeneous) with linear demand. Let the demand for firm i’s product be
pi ¼ α qi  βqj, where i; j 2 f1; 2g with. ij, and β 2 0; 1 represents the degree
of product differentiation. Further, assume that each industry may compete on
either quantity or price. This gives rise to the following three combinations:
Cournot competition in both industries (Cournot–Cournot); upstream Cournot
competition and downstream Bertrand competition (Cournot–Bertrand); and
Bertrand competition in both industries (Bertrand–Bertrand). For each of the
three cases, a payoff table similar to Table 1 can be constructed (an example is
shown in the Appendix), where each payoff is a function of β only.12
12 Again, α c can be normalized without losing any generality.
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Proposition 2.
(1) In the Cournot–Cournot case, S1 is stable for β > 0:29 and S3 is stable for any β.
(2) In the Cournot–Bertrand case, S1 is stable for 0:22 < β < 0:8, S2 is stable for
β > 0:66, and S3 is stable for β < 0:66.
(3) In the Bertrand–Bertrand case, S3 is stable for.. and S2 is stable for any β.
Proof: See the Appendix.
As Proposition 2 suggests, a single merger (S4, S5, and S6) can never be
stable. The reason has been discussed in the example and will be further
elaborated later. The remaining three configurations, no-merger (S1) and hor-
izontal and vertical merger waves (S2 and S3), can all be stable under certain
conditions. A general pattern is that as competition intensifies (moving from
Cournot to Bertrand), horizontal mergers become more likely, while vertical
mergers and no-merger become less likely.
The equilibrium results shown in Table 2 exemplify the implications of
Proposition 2. The parameter range indicates the condition for a particular
configuration to be stable, and the parenthesis below indicates the profitable
deviation that makes the configuration unstable when the condition is violated.
For example, in the Cournot–Cournot case, S1 is stable for β > 0:29. If β < 0:29,
S1 becomes unstable because Aþ B is a profitable deviation.
4.1.1 Cournot–Cournot
The setting is the same as in the example except that the final products are
differentiated, so the example is a special case with β ¼ 1. Greater differentiation
Table 2: Results of Propositions 2 and 3.
Cases S1 (4I) S2 (2H) S3 (2V)
Cournot–Cournot β > 0:29 Never Always
(Aþ B) (Aþ 1)
Cournot–Bertrand 0:22 < β < 0:80 β > 0:66 β < 0:66
(Aþ B) (1þ 2) (Aþ 1) (Aþ B)
Bertrand–Bertrand Never Always β < 0:66
(Aþ B) (Aþ B)
Increasing mc γ < 2 γ > 2 γ < 2
(1þ 2) (Aþ 1) (1þ 2)
General demand Always σ > 1 σ  1
(Aþ 1) (Aþ B)
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between the final products weakens the downstream competition. If products
are sufficiently differentiated (β is small), the downstream horizontal externality
is greatly weakened. 4I is no longer stable because there is no need to use
vertical externality to mitigate the horizontal externality. In the example, 2V
dominates 2H because downstream horizontal competition is less damaging
than double markup. Product differentiation further reduces the damage of
horizontal competition, so 2V is always stable for any β while 2H is never stable.
4.1.2 Cournot–Bertrand
When downstream firms compete on price rather than quantity, downstream
competition is intensified. 4I is stable only if the products are modestly differen-
tiated (intermediate β). When products are highly differentiated the downstream
competition is too weak; when products are close substitutes the downstream
competition is too strong. 4I is unstable in either case. As explained earlier, product
differentiation favors 2V over 2H, so 2V continues to be stable when products are
sufficiently differentiated (small β). Conversely, when products are close substitutes
(large β), fierce competition in the downstream industry raises both the benefits of
horizontal mergers and the drawbacks of vertical mergers, so 2H becomes stable.
4.1.3 Bertrand–Bertrand
The upstream firms also compete on price now, so upstream competition is
intensified. In fact it is intensified to the greatest extent as inputs are homo-
geneous. 4I is never stable because upstream firms earn zero profits in the 4I
situation and they will always attempt to merge. As in the previous case, 2V is
stable when the products are sufficiently differentiated. 2H is stable for any β
because the upstream horizontal competition is too strong.13
4.2 Cost and Demand
We now move back to the setting with a homogeneous final product and
Cournot competition in both industries, and change the cost or demand, one
13 Starting from 2H, if an upstream and a downstream firm deviate to form a vertical merger,
one scenario they may face is that the other two firms do not merge. The upstream firm’s profit
share in the merger will then be very low because it is calculated based on the situation where
the merger does not take place, in which case its profit will be zero due to upstream price
competition.
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at a time. There are two cases. In the increasing marginal cost case, the cost of
input production is CðqÞ ¼ γq2 with γ  0, while the demand for the final
product continues to be linear (p ¼ α Q). Note that the example in Section 3
is a special case of increasing mc with γ ¼ 0.14 If γ > 0, marginal cost (mc)
increases with production quantity. In the general demand case, the demand
for the final product is p ¼ α Qσ with α > 0 and σ > 0, while the input cost is
linear (CðqÞ ¼ cq). Again the example is a special case with σ ¼ 1. Note a
peculiar property of this general demand function: Its concavity, defined as
p
00 ðQÞQ
p0 ðQÞ , is constant.
15
Proposition 3.
(1) In the increasing marginal cost case with CðqÞ ¼ γq2, S1 and S3 are stable for
γ < 2, and S2 is stable for γ > 2.
(2) In the general demand case with p ¼ α Qσ, S1 is stable for any σ, S2 is
stable for σ > 1, and S3 is stable when σ  1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The results of Proposition 3 have already been summarized in Table 2.
Again, a single merger (S4, S5, and S6) is never stable.
4.2.1 Increasing Marginal Cost
Producing the inputs at increasing marginal cost will reduce the upstream
competition.16 When the mc curve is steep (γ is large), 4I is unstable because
an upstream merger will not raise the input price by much and therefore will do
little damage to the downstream firms. As a result, the downstream firms will
find it profitable to merge. An increasing marginal cost favors 2H over 2V. The
benefit of a vertical merger comes from output expansion due to the elimination
of double markup. When the marginal cost of the input increases with quantity,
expansion is increasingly costly, so the benefits of vertical mergers decrease.
14 In the example the exact value of c is inconsequential, as all profits are proportional to
ðα cÞ2 and consequently α c has been normalized without any loss of generality. We may as
well think that c ¼ 0.
15 In fact, p
00 ðQÞQ
p0 ðQÞ ¼ σ  1. This function has been used by Greenhut and Ohta (1976) and other
scholars of merger incentives and/or vertically related industries.
16 In terms of oligopoly behavior, product homogeneity with increasing marginal costs is
mathematically equivalent to product differentiation with constant marginal cost (Vives 1999).
In a sense, the increasing marginal cost considered here introduces differentiation to the inputs.
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When the mc curve is flat (γ is small), such a decrease is small, so 2V continues
to dominate 2H, meaning that 2V is stable while 2H is not.
4.2.2 General Demand
An increase in the concavity of demand lessens the severity of the double
markup problem.17 As will be argued below, 4I is always threatened by
horizontal mergers rather than vertical ones. But demand concavity affects
mainly double markup, which is present in both the 4I and 2H configurations,
so 2H is never a real threat and consequently 4I is stable for any value of the
demand’s concavity. When the demand is convex (σ < 1) the double markup
problem is very severe, so firms merge vertically to avoid the damage, leading
to 2V. Conversely, when the demand is concave (σ > 1) double markup is less
of a problem. Avoiding horizontal competition becomes the major concern, so
2H is stable.
4.3 Discussion
As was seen with the example, the stability of a configuration depends crucially
on the relative intensity of double markup and horizontal competition in the two
industries. Each of the five variation settings introduces a parameter that affects
one of the three intensities. Compared to the example, differentiation of the final
products (Cournot–Cournot) weakens the downstream competition; Bertrand
competition downstream (Cournot–Bertrand) intensifies the downstream compe-
tition; Bertrand competition upstream (Bertrand–Bertrand) intensifies the
upstream competition. Increasing marginal cost for input production weakens
the upstream competition, whereas greater demand concavity lessens the sever-
ity of double markup. The stable structures of the five variation settings are
presented graphically in Figure 1, where the bullet point represents the exam-
ple’s result as a special case.
17 A single-level monopolist facing constant marginal cost c and demand p ¼ α Qσ will
choose quantity.:. In successive monopoly with the same cost and demand, the quantity chosen
will be Q2 ¼ αcð1þσÞ2
h i1
σ
< Q1. As a measure of the severity of double markup, Q1Q2;ð1þ σÞ
1
σ declines
with σ, indicating that double markup is less of a problem when σ increases. Basically, when σ
is larger, the demand for input is closer to the demand for the final product.
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4.3.1 Merging in Waves
In all cases with any parameter values, there is always a stable configuration
involving two mergers, either horizontal or vertical, while a single merger
(S4, S5, and S6) is never stable. So mergers always come in waves. The driving
force is still the two profitability rankings seen in the example. An exogenous
merger between any two firms is always profitable (R1), and a merger always
hurts other firms (R2). Below we explain why they still hold in general. Once
they are established, our game rule immediately implies that configurations with
only single merger can never be stable.
Consider first the configuration with only a vertical merger (S4). The merged
firm becomes more competitive in the downstream competition, so the merger
hurts the other two firms. Fixing the first merger, a merger between the remain-
ing two firms is profitable because it internalizes the vertical externality gener-
ated by double markup.
Next consider the configuration with only an upstream horizontal merger
(S5). This merger raises the input price and thereby hurts downstream firms.
Fixing the upstream merger, the downstream firms can merge from duopoly to
monopoly, which should always be profitable. But the complication is the
Figure 1: Stable configurations in the five variation settings.
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presence of the upstream industry. In particular, upstream firms may try to share
the benefit of the downstream merger by raising the input price, which will
reduce the profitability of the downstream merger. However, it can be verified
that in all the settings we have considered so far, a downstream merger never
changes the equilibrium input price.18 As a result, a downstream merger con-
tinues to be profitable despite the upstream industry’s response.
Finally consider the configuration with only a downstream horizontal mer-
ger (S6). This merger reduces the quantity of inputs demanded without changing
the input price, so it hurts upstream firms. Fixing the downstream merger, the
upstream firms may merge from duopoly into a monopoly, which again should
always be profitable. And again the complication is the presence of a vertically
related industry downstream. However, the demand that upstream firms face is
derived from the downstream competition. As long as the downstream config-
uration is fixed, that demand does not change. An upstream merger continues
then to be profitable despite the downstream industry’s response.
4.3.2 The Stability of Not Merging
In all cases except Bertrand–Bertrand competition, it is stable under certain
conditions for all firms to remain independent (4I). Firms in 4I may deviate into
either a horizontal or a vertical merger, but what really matters is how the
deviators expect to do in a situation where the other two firms also merge. That
is, the alternative to 4I is essentially a merger wave resulting in either 2H or 2V.
The stability of 4I depends on the four firms’ total profits and their distribu-
tion among them. In terms of total profits, 4I tends to outperform both 2H and
2V. In all cases except Bertrand-Bertrand competition, 2V eliminates double
markup but retains horizontal competition, so the firms over-produce from the
viewpoint of their joint profits, a horizontal externality. By contrast, 2H removes
horizontal competition but retains double markups, so the firms under-produce,
which can be viewed as a vertical externality. 4I has both externalities, but since
18 In the example, the equilibrium input price is t ¼ cþ αcðuþ1Þðvþ1Þ, which does not depend on d.
So if there is a downstream merger (i.e. d decreases by 1), the equilibrium input price will not
change. A downstream merger rotates the demand for inputs clockwise around the intercept.
This rotation has two opposite effects on t: For any given t, the quantity demanded is smaller,
so t tends to drop. At the same time, the demand becomes less elastic, so t tends to rise. In the
case of linear demand for the final product, the two forces exactly cancel each other so the
equilibrium input price will be independent of the number of downstream firms. For non-linear
demand, Greenhut and Ohta (1976) and Ziss (2005) have shown the same invariance as long as
the demand has constant concavity, which is satisfied by the general demand adopted here.
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the two externalities move in opposite directions, one mitigates the other and
the firms’ total profits tend to increase.
The distribution of the total profit also matters for the stability of 4I. For a
deviating vertical merger in 4I to be profitable, the merging pair will have to
earn more. Because the two vertical pairs are symmetrical, the four firms’ total
profits must therefore be higher in 2V than in 4I, which is unlikely. By contrast,
4I can easily be disrupted by a horizontal merger; such a deviation need only
benefit one horizontal pair, not both. So the stability of 4I is always threatened
by a horizontal merger, not a vertical one.
Whether or not the threat will materialize depends on the relative intensity
of horizontal competition in the upstream and downstream industries. If the two
competitions are more or less balanced, 4I can be stable. For example, in the
Bertrand–Bertrand situation, the upstream competition is very strong, so 4I is
never stable at any β. In the Cournot–Bertrand situation, the competition is
balanced only for moderate differentiation in the final products.
4.3.3 Vertical and Horizontal Merger Waves
In all cases and with any parameter values there is always a stable configuration
involving two mergers, either horizontal (2H) or vertical (2V). Furthermore,
except with Bertrand–Bertrand competition, the two structures are mutually
exclusive: When 2H is stable, 2V is unstable, and vice versa. For 2H, the threat
to stability comes mainly from a vertical merger. Given the assumptions, the
deviating firms are mainly concerned about the situation in which the other two
firms also merge vertically, so the alternative market structure to 2H is basically
2V. Similarly, the alternative to 2V is 2H. Therefore, 2H and 2V will be essentially
the only market structures that the firms consider when they ponder a merger or
deviation. At any given set of parameter values, either 2H dominates 2V (for a
horizontal pair) or 2V dominates 2H (for both vertical pairs), so one and only one
of the two configurations is stable.
Which is stable depends crucially on how the total profits distribute among
the four firms, which in turn depends on the relative intensity of upstream and
downstream competition. Because firms within an industry are assumed sym-
metric, the two vertical pairs are symmetric while the two horizontal pairs are
not. For 2H to be stable, 2H needs to dominate 2V for only one horizontal pair,
either upstream or downstream. By contrast, for 2V to be stable, 2V has to
dominate 2H for all four firms. When competition in both industries is balanced,
2V tends to be stable. When an industry’s competition is greatly intensified or
weakened, 2H tends to be stable. For example, price (rather than quantity)
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competition or closer substitutability between final products will lead to a
horizontal merger wave. Greatly weakened competition in the upstream indus-
try, due to increasing marginal costs of input production, will have a similar
effect, because downstream competition is now relatively intensified and firms
there would like to merge horizontally. These results demonstrate that changes
of competition in one industry may induce mergers in a vertically related
industry.
To summarize, both 4I and 2V are disrupted by 2H, while 2H is disrupted by
2V. 4I tends to outperform both 2H and 2V in terms of the four firms’ total profits.
Between 2H and 2V, the comparison of total profits depends on the tradeoff
between double markup and downstream horizontal competition. For example,
when the demand for the final products is convex, double markup is a severe
problem, so 2V prevails. When the downstream competition is Bertrand and the
final products are close substitutes, the downstream competition is intense, so
firms merge horizontally. These predictions are straightforward. More interesting
and somewhat surprising is the role of the relative intensity of competition in the
two industries. When the intensities are balanced, both 4I and 2V tend to be
stable. When the competition in one industry is greatly intensified or weakened,
2H tends to be stable.
4.3.4 Two triggers of Merger Waves
A model of endogenous merger waves must explain not only why a merger wave
takes place, but also why it did not take place earlier. In other words, the
structure before and after the wave must both be stable. As Figure 1 indicates,
in all five cases at any parameter value, there are at most two stable configura-
tions and at least one. For some ranges of the parameters there is a unique
stable configuration, which invariably contains two mergers, either 2V or 2H. If
the parameter falls into that range, the mergers should take place immediately,
so the only explanation for why they did not take place earlier is that the
parameter was outside the range, where it was stable for all firms to remain
independent. Such a change of parameter value can be interpreted as an
economic shock. For example, in the Cournot–Cournot situation, 2V is the
unique equilibrium for β < 0:29, and 4I is an equilibrium (though not unique)
for β > 0:29. If β drops from a value greater than 0.29 to a value below it, the
industry will undergo a wave of vertical mergers. So an increase in the differ-
entiation of the final products (due to, say, more investment in R&D or advertis-
ing) may trigger a vertical merger wave. Likewise, a more convex demand curve
may also trigger a vertical merger wave. Similarly, a horizontal merger wave may
Vertical or Horizontal Merger Waves 1255
Brought to you by | University of Hong Kong Libraries
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/29/15 10:18 AM
be triggered by greater substitutability between the final products (Cournot–
Bertrand), steeper marginal cost in input production, or greater concavity of
demand.
For some other ranges of the parameters there are exactly two stable
structures, and in most cases one is 4I and the other is either 2V or 2H. When
that is the case, it is possible for a merger wave to take place without any change
in the underlying economic conditions, as the example shows. For example, a
vertical merger wave is possible when the products are close substitutes
(Cournot–Cournot), when marginal cost rises slowly, or when the demand is
convex. A horizontal merger wave can occur when product differentiation is
moderate (Cournot–Bertrand) or the demand is concave.
So both tangible and intangible causes may trigger a merger wave.19 A
tangible trigger is an economic shock that changes business conditions. An
intangible trigger might be a rumor or a sudden change in expectations or
mood that shifts the market structure between two stable configurations without
any change in the underlying economic conditions.
The equilibrium may also switch between 2H and 2V. In a sense this is also a
merger wave, although it involves more restructuring because firms have to
disintegrate and then re-integrate. Both tangible and intangible triggers also
can be found for such merger waves. For example, with Bertrand–Bertrand
competition the economy may switch from 2V to 2H, the pattern of structural
changes observed in the semiconductor industry. Such a wave of vertical disin-
tegration followed by horizontal integration can have an intangible trigger when
the products are poor substitutes, or a tangible trigger when the final products
become closer substitutes.
5 Conclusions
We have studied merger waves in vertically related industries where firms can
engage in both vertical and horizontal mergers. Whether, why and how a merger
wave takes place has been shown to depend on the balance between vertical
and horizontal externalities and the balance between upstream and downstream
competition. A merger wave may happen with or without any fundamental
change in the underlying economic conditions. The research has generated
19 In a study of horizontal mergers, Toxvaerd (2008) found no-merger and multiple mergers to
be equilibrium under identical or different conditions, which could imply the two types of
triggers.
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many empirically testable predictions relating merger waves to conditions such
as product differentiation, cost structure, and demand concavity.
Although the particular equilibria are derived based on the specific equili-
brium concept and number of firms, the general conclusions seem robust
because the driving force is the total profits and their distribution among the
firms, which are model-independent, relating only to the relative strength
between double markup and upstream and downstream competition. The equi-
librium concept was adopted from the matching literature, and it served our
purpose well, as other equilibrium concepts from the coalition-formation litera-
ture are either too strong so that the equilibrium set is empty, or too weak so that
the set is too large.
The simplest possible setting with two upstream and two downstream firms
has been used. In this setting an exogenous merger always benefits the merging
firms and hurts non-merging firms. These effects conform to common under-
standing of what a merger means, particularly for vertically related industries,
and they hold regardless of whether firms compete on price or quantity. The
drawback is that horizontal and vertical merger waves cannot coexist. Merging
from duopoly into a monopoly is also special. If each industry has more than
two firms, one concern is that a two-firm merger may not be profitable (Salant,
Switzer, and Reynolds 1983). This can be dealt with by allowing mergers to
generate synergies.20 Our purpose is not to explain the profitability of any single
merger. Rather, we treat the profitability as given and focus on the interaction
between mergers.
Merger decisions in this model are made simultaneously. A sequential
game would have the advantage of generating strategic incentives for mergers
and may therefore yield other explanations for merger waves (Qiu and Zhou
2007). But the disadvantage is that the equilibrium will be sensitive to the
order of moves and other details of the game,21 which a researcher has no
compelling reason or sufficient information to specify exogenously. So this
study has adopted a simultaneous game and an equilibrium concept bor-
rowed from one-to-one matching games with externalities. This has enabled
20 This can be easily done with product differentiation, increasing marginal costs, or constant
but differential marginal costs. In a 3  3 setting without synergies, the Appendix shows that
there are two equilibria, one in which all firms remain independent and the other in which three
vertical mergers take place. Similar patterns have been found in the 3  4, 4  3, 4  4, and
more general nm settings (Yao and Zhou 2011).
21 For example, Colangelo’s (1995) sequential game leads to very different predictions about
the equilibrium market structure depending on the identity of the first acquisition target, which
is exogenously given.
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us to capture the essential interdependence of merger incentives without
having to specify the details. It may therefore prove useful in studying other
merger-related issues.
The merger surplus was calculated assuming a fixed configuration among
remaining firms, which seems to contradict the idea that firms consider all
possible configurations when contemplating a merger. However, if configura-
tions are allowed to vary in calculating profit sharing, the profits will be ill-
defined because there are multiple configurations. The assumption of fixed and
equal sharing rule between merger partners is not as strong as it seems, because
the major conclusion is driven by the relative intensity of vertical and horizontal
externalities/competition, which is independent of the concrete sharing rule.
The assumption of arm’s length transaction may seem problematic when an
industry has only one firm, but what is really needed is double markup and the
property that vertical transactions depend on the market structure in both
industries. Such assumptions are relevant in many situations. An alternative to
arm’s length transactions may be two-part tariff. The Bertrand–Bertrand
assumption removes double markup and may therefore have already captured
what will happen when a two-part tariff is used between upstream and down-
stream firms.
This has been a first step in studying endogenous merger waves in vertically
related industries. Many interesting extensions remain to be explored, such as
asymmetric firms, dynamic game rules, and more sophisticated settings and
sharing rules.
Appendix
Procedures for Proving Propositions 2 and 3
The calculation and proofs are tedious. Here we provide only the procedures. In
each case, we construct a payoff table similar to Table 1. Each payoff will be a
function containing a single parameter (it turns out that α c can be normalized
to 1 without any loss of generality). For example, in the Cournot–Cournot case
the following payoff table results. Other tables are available from the corre-
sponding author on request.
Given the payoffs, the stability of each configuration is easily examined. For
a configuration to be stable, every possible deviation must be checked to show
that it is unprofitable for at least one firm. For a configuration to be unstable, we
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need to only find one deviation that is profitable for both deviators (when it is a
joint deviation).
For S1 ¼ fA;B; 1; 2g to be stable: (i) Aþ B is unprofitable: πS1A > minfπS2A ; πS5A g;
(ii) 1þ 2 is unprofitable: πS11 > minfπS21 ; πS61 g; and (iii) Aþ 1 is unprofitable:
πS1i > minfπS3i ; πS4i g for i ¼ A or 1.
For S2 ¼ fAB; 12g to be stable: (i) Breaking AB is unprofitable:
πS2A > minfπS1A ; πS6A g; (ii) breaking 12 is unprofitable: πS21 > minfπS11 ; πS51 g; and (iii)
Aþ 1 is unprofitable: πS2i > minfπS3i ; πS4i g for i ¼ A or 1.
For S3 ¼ fA1;B2g to be stable: (i) Breaking B2 is unprofitable:
πS3i > minfπS1i ; πS4i g for i ¼ B and 2; (ii) Aþ B is unprofitable:
πS3A > minfπS2A ; πS5A g; and (iii) 1þ 2 is unprofitable: πS31 > minfπS21 ; πS61 g.
For S4 ¼ fB;A1; 2g to be unstable, we only need one of following cases to
hold: (i) Bþ 2 is profitable: πS4i < minfπS3i ; πS4j g for both fi ¼ B; j ¼ Ag and
fi ¼ 2; j ¼ 1g; (ii) Aþ B is profitable: πS4A < minfπS2A ; πS5A g; (iii) 1þ 2 is profitable:
πS41 < minfπS21 ; πS61 g; (iv) Breaking A1 is profitable: πS4i < minfπS1i ; πS4j g for either
fi ¼ A, j ¼ Bg or fi ¼ 1, j ¼ 2g; (v) Aþ 2 is profitable: πS4i < minfπS3i ; πS4j g for
both i ¼ j ¼ A and fi ¼ 2, j ¼ 1g; and (vi) Bþ 1 is profitable: πS4i < minfπS3i ; πS4j g
for both fi ¼ B, j ¼ Ag and i ¼ j ¼ 1.
For S5 ¼ fAB; 1; 2g to be unstable: 1þ 2 is profitable since
πS51 < minfπS21 ; πS61 g.
For S6 ¼ fA;B; 12g to be unstable: Aþ B is profitable since
πS6A < minfπS2A ; πS5A g.
Table 3: Payoffs in the Cournot–Cournot case.
Configuration πA πB π1 π2 Total profits
S1 ¼ fA;B; 1; 2g 29ð2þ βÞ
2
9ð2þ βÞ
4
9ð2þ βÞ2
4
9ð2þ βÞ2
4ð4þ βÞ
9ð2þ βÞ2
S2 ¼ fAB; 12g 18ð1þ βÞ
1
8ð1þ βÞ
1
16ð1þ βÞ
1
16ð1þ βÞ
3
8ð1þ βÞ
S3 ¼ fA1;B2g 10 β
2
16ð2þ βÞ2
10 β2
16ð2þ βÞ2
6þ β2
16ð2þ βÞ2
6þ β2
16ð2þ βÞ2
2
ð2þ βÞ2
S4 ¼ fA1;B; 2g 144þ 104β þ 9β
2
288ð2þ βÞ2
2 β
8ð2þ βÞ
144þ 40β þ 9β2
288ð2þ βÞ2
1
4ð2þ βÞ2
28þ 8β  β2
16ð2þ βÞ2
S5 ¼ fAB; 1; 2g 14ð2þ βÞ
1
4ð2þ βÞ
1
4ð2þ βÞ2
1
4ð2þ βÞ2
3þ β
2ð2þ βÞ2
S6 ¼ fA;B; 12g 19ð1þ βÞ
1
9ð1þ βÞ
1
9ð1þ βÞ
1
9ð1þ βÞ
4
9ð1þ βÞ
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The 3 × 3 Case
Suppose there are three identical upstream firms (A, B, C) and three identical
downstream firms (1, 2, 3). The other assumptions remain the same as in the
example. There are then 10 possible market configurations as shown in the
following payoff table. As the next proposition reveals, the firms will either all
remain independent or carry out three vertical mergers, which is consistent with
the result of the example.
Proposition 4. In the three-by-three case, S1 and S2 are stable.
Proof: S1 is stable because there is no profitable deviation. There are three
possible collective deviations excluding symmetric ones: Bþ C, 2þ 3, and
Aþ 1. Bþ C is not profitable since both B and C are worse off in S5. 2þ 3 is
not profitable since both firms are worse off in S5. Aþ 1 is not profitable because
both A and 1 are worse off in S2.
S2 is stable. First, there is no profitable unilateral deviation, as no firm wants
to break up with its merger partner. For example, if C3 breaks up, both C and 3
are worse off in S3 as compared to S2. Second, there is no profitable collective
deviation. There are two possible collective deviations: Bþ C and 2þ 3: Bþ C is
not profitable since both of them are worse off in S6 as compared to S2. 2þ 3 is
not profitable either since both of them are worse off in S7 as compared to S2.
S3 is not stable since C þ 3 is a profitable deviation. S4, S5, S6, and S7 are not
stable since Bþ 2 is a profitable deviation in any of these configurations. S8, S9,
and S10 would have been stable using our stability criterion as specified in the
example, but they are unreasonable equilibrium market structures. BC prefers to
Table 4: Payoffs in the 3  3 case.
Configurations πA πB πC π1 π2 π3 Total profits
S1 ¼ fA;B;C; 1; 2; 3g       
S2 ¼ fA1;B2;C3g    . . . .
S3 ¼ fC; A1;B2; 3g . .  . . . .
S4 ¼ fB;C; A1; 2; 3g .   .   
S5 ¼ fBC;A1; 23g    .   
S6 ¼ fBC;A1; 2; 3g    . . . .
S7 ¼ fB;C;A1; 23g  . .  . . .
S8 ¼ fA;BC; 1; 23g    .   
S9 ¼ fA;BC; 1; 2; 3g . . .    
S10 ¼ fA;B;C; 1; 23g . . . .   
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break up in both S8 and S9, while 23 prefers to break up in S10. Those firms won’t
merge horizontally due to the merger paradox argument (Salant, Switzer, and
Reynolds 1983). Q.E.D.
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